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ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE IN
SUBSEQUENT CIVIL PROCEEDINGS: FOCUSING ON
MOTIVE TO DETERMINE DETERRENCE
INTRODUCTION
The exclusionary rule,' once premised on notions of personal right
and judicial integrity,2 is now invoked primarily to deter3 government
1. In 1914, in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court
adopted the exclusionary rule as a means of enforcing the fourth amendment guaran-
tee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 398. Weeks, however, held
only that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment would be inadmissi-
ble in federal criminal trials. Nearly fifty years passed before the rule was extended to
state criminal prosecutions in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling, Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Wolf Court had refused to extend the rule to
the states, notwithstanding its holding that the fourth amendment was incorporated
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Wolf Court had
concluded that the Weeks exclusionary rule was a matter of judicial implication and
not an explicit command of the fourth amendment. 338 U.S. at 28; see Note, Reason
and the Fourth Amendment-The Burger Court and the Exclusionary Rule, 46
Fordham L. Rev. 139, 139-43 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Reason and the Fourth
Amendment]. Whether the exclusionary rule is a matter of constitutional right or
merely a judicially created remedy to enforce the fourth amendment guarantee
against unreasonable searches is of great importance in determining how far the rule
should extend. The precise nature of the rule, however, has been the subject of much
debate. Justice Brennan has argued that the rule is constitutionally based and is
intended to "[accomplish] the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint
of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people. . . that the govern-
ment would not profit from its lawless behavior." United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Calandra Court, however,
treated the rule as merely a judicially created tool, not a right in itself. id. at 348.
This view has persisted and has been criticized. See, e.g., Yarbrough, The Flexible
Exclusionary Rule and the Crime Rate, 6 Am. J. Crim. L. 1 (1978). Yarbrough
pointed out that "it is highly debatable whether the Court even has authority to
impose non-constitutional standards such as ... Mapp-Weeks are now purported to
have established, at least in state cases." Id. at 18. This controversy is beyond the
scope of this Note. For purposes of discussion within this Note the rule will be viewed
from the perspective of the Calandra majority.
2. Historically, three major theories have been advanced as justifications for the
exclusionary rule: the enforcement of a personal right, the maintenance of judicial
integrity and the deterrence of official misconduct. See, e.g., Geller, Enforcing the
Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 Wash. U.L.Q.
621, 640-52; Note, Confusion Regarding Exclusion: The Evolution of the Fourth
Amendment, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 801, 802-06 (1981). Geller also suggests several other
possible bases for the rule. Geller, supra, at 652-56. Under the personal right theory,
the goal of the exclusionary rule is the vindication of a personal right secured by the
Constitution. See Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 (1926); Couled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 303-06 (1921); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
393 (1914); Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal
Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, Tenth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1979-1980, 69 Geo.
L.J. 151, 191 (1980); Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule
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officials from committing fourth amendment violations. 4 Courts em-
ploy a balancing test to determine whether the likely deterrent effect
of exclusion outweighs the benefit to society of admitting the tainted
evidence in a given situation.5 This balancing is generally conducted
with reference to the particular proceeding in which the seizing offi-
as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 Minn. L. Rev. 251, 272 (1974); Note, The
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: Past, Present, No Future, 12 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 507, 508-10 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Past, Present, No Future]. The essence
of the judicial integrity theory is a refusal to allow the judiciary to become an
accomplice to the constitutional violation through the admission of illegally seized
evidence. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Saltz-
burg, supra, at 192; Past, Present, No Future, supra, at 510-11.
3. The deterrence rationale is based on the theory that the exclusion of illegally
seized evidence will deter future police misconduct. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
484 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976); Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949), overruled, Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Past, Present, No Future, supra note 2, at 511-17. The
Supreme Court has made it clear that this rationale is the primary, if not sole,
purpose for the rule. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). The
Calandra Court stated that "[i]n sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." Id. at 348. It should be
noted however, that the deterrence view of the exclusionary rule is arguably incon-
sistent with the Court's traditional view on standing for fourth amendment viola-
tions. Only the individual personally aggrieved whose "legitimate expectation of
privacy" has been invaded, has standing to raise the issue. United States v. Payner,
447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980); see Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229-30 (1973);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963). This apparent conflict has generated some comment. See,
e.g., Burkoff, The Court that Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an
Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 Or. L. Rev. 151, 162-67 (1979); Kuhns, The
Concept of Personal Aggrievement in Fourth Amendment Standing Cases, 65 Iowa
L. Rev. 493, 503-07 (1980); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 734-36 (1970); Note, Judicial Control of Illegal
Search and Seizure, 58 Yale L.J. 144, 154-58 (1948).
4. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
5. The balance of interests test said to be implicit in all fourth amendment
exclusionary rule decisions, was made explicit by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348-54 (1974). The Court stated that a weighing of the
potential benefits of exclusion against the potential harm of losing relevant evidence
is required. See id. For discussion and criticism of how this balance of interests test
has been articulated and applied, see 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise
on the Fourth Amendment § 1.5 (1978); Burkoff, supra note 3, at 168-72.
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cial intended the evidence to be used. 6 A more complicated issue arises
when evidence, which would be or has been excluded from the pro-
ceeding it was apparently intended for, is introduced in a subsequent
civil action.'
In United States v. Janis,8 the Supreme Court was squarely pre-
sented with this issue. The Court's opinion, however, does not provide
definitive guidelines, for its holding is narrow and its language ambig-
uous. Consequently, lower courts interpreting Janis have taken a
variety of approaches in both government and private civil litigation.
Some courts, in applying the balance of interest test, place undue
reliance on the nature of the proceeding, and extend the exclusionary
rule only to civil actions that are "quasi-criminal" in nature." Others
6. Application of the balancing test to civil proceedings for which the search
was conducted has led to differing results. Compare Wong Chung Che v. Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Serv., 565 F.2d 166, 169 (1st Cir. 1977) (deportation hearing;
evidence inadmissible) and Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223,
238-39 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (high school student disciplinary hearing; evidence inadmis-
sible) and Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 793-95 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (college
student disciplinary hearing; evidence inadmissible) with Donovan v. Federal Clear-
ing Die Casting Co., 695 F.2d 1020, 1022-25 (7th Cir. 1982) (OSHA enforcement
proceeding; evidence admissible) and Robberson Steel Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 645 F.2d 22, 22 (10th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (same).
7. The term "subsequent" civil proceeding is used in a broad sense and is not
limited only to situations in which the civil proceeding is instituted after the conclu-
sion of the proceeding for which the search was conducted. For example, conceivably
the civil proceeding in issue will be instituted in lieu of the originally contemplated
action. See, e.g., Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 404
(S.D. Iowa 1968), aff'd sub nom. as to exclusionary rule issue, Standard Oil Co. v.
Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969), aff'd as to attorney'sfees issue, 409 F.2d 1239
(8th Cir. 1969); Rinderknecht v. Maricopa County Employees Merit Sys., 21 Ariz.
App. 419, 421-22, 520 P.2d 332, 334-35, vacated after settlement, 111 Ariz. 174, 526
P.2d 713 (1974).
8. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
9. Cases invoking the quasi-criminal/civil distinction in deciding whether to
extend the rule include: One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693,
700-02 (1965) (forfeiture proceeding held quasi-criminal; extended the rule); Honey-
cutt v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 340, 348 (7th Cir.) (action by insured against insurer
held purely civil; refused to extend rule), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Romano
v. Home Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 191, 193 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (dictum) (same); United
States v. One 1976 Cadillac Seville, 477 F. Supp. 879, 883 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(forfeiture proceeding held quasi-criminal; extended the rule); Iowa v. Union As-
phalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 407 (S.D. Iowa 1968) (antitrust suit held
quasi-criminal; extended the rule), aff'd sub nom. as to exclusionary rule issue,
Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969), aff'd as to attorney's fees
issue, 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180, 182
(N.D. Ohio 1966) (enforcement of wagering excise tax provisions held quasi-crimi-
nal; extended the rule); Rinderknecht v. Maricopa County Employees Merit Sys., 21
Ariz. App. 419, 421-22, 520 P.2d 332, 334-35 (employee disciplinary proceeding held
quasi-criminal; extended the rule), vacated after settlement, 111 Ariz. 174, 526 P.2d
713 (1974); Lamartiniere v. Department of Employment Sec., 372 So. 2d 690, 692
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rely on an inter/intrasovereign distinction, making the identity of the
sovereign the dispositive factor in the balance. 10 Still other courts,
rather than relying on either the identity of the sovereign or the nature
of the proceeding, apply the balance of interests test on a case-by-case
basis."
This Note contends that these approaches fail to give appropriate
consideration to the primary goal of the exclusionary rule-deter-
rence. In place of these tests, this Note urges the adoption of the test
utilized by the Second Circuit in Tirado v. Commissioner.12 The
Tirado analysis seeks to determine whether the official responsibilities
and personal interests of the seizing officer are at all related to the
subsequent civil proceeding. This inquiry will reveal whether use of
the tainted evidence in the civil proceeding provided an incentive for
the illegal search. If so, excluding the evidence achieves the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule. Furthermore, by exploring the motives
of the seizing official, the Second Circuit approach best serves the
needs of society by excluding relevant evidence only when necessary to
compel compliance with the fourth amendment. Moreover, by estab-
lishing guidelines this test facilitates consistent application of the ex-
clusionary rule in all civil proceedings.
(La. App.) (unemployment compensation hearing held purely civil; refused to extend
rule), writ denied, 375 So. 2d 945 (La. 1979); New Brunswick v. Speights, 157 N.J.
Super. 9, 21, 384 A.2d 225, 231 (Middlesex County Ct. 1978) (dictum) (would extend
in police department disciplinary proceeding). The term "quasi-criminal" pertains to
those offenses known as quasi-crimes. One authority has defined "quasi-crimes" as
all offenses not crimes or misdemeanors, but that are in the nature of
crimes. A class of offenses against the public which have not been declared
crimes, but wrongs against the general or local public which it is proper [to
repress or punish] by forfeitures and penalties. [The term] embrace[s] all qui
tam actions and forfeitures imposed for the neglect or violation of a public
duty . . . whether voluntary or involuntary, [or] where a penalty is given,
whether recoverable by criminal or civil process.
Black's Law Dictionary 335 (5th ed. 1979).
10. See, e.g., Vander Linden v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 693, 697 (S.D. Iowa
1980) (evidence excluded because intrasovereign violation); Velasco v. IRS, 80-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 9590, at 84,924 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (evidence not excluded because
intersovereign violation); Gaston v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9126,
at 86,087 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (same); Guzzetta v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 173, 180-84
(1982) (same). The term "intrasovereign" refers to a factual situation in which all the
parties involved-that is, the seizing officials and the officials who seek to use the
evidence-are agents of the same sovereign.
11. See, e.g., Jonas v. City of Atlanta, 647 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 1981) (societal
interest in obtaining accurate factual findings outweighs deterrent value of exclu-
sion); People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745, 748 (Colo. 1981) (societal interest in
protecting public from unethical lawyers outweighs deterrent value of exclusion).
12. 689 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1982).
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I. JANIS: CREATING UNCERTAINTY
A. The Supreme Court Decision
The applicability of the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings has
never been fully resolved by the Supreme Court.' 3 The most recent
Supreme Court case to consider the rule's application to a civil action
is United States" v. Janis. 14 Janis involved an Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) assessment for unpaid wagering taxes. The assessment had been
calculated solely on the basis of evidence 5 illegally seized by state
police officers investigating alleged bookmaking activity.' 6 Soon after
the seizure, the IRS was notified of Janis' arrest and allowed access to
the seized evidence.' 7 As a result, the IRS assessed wagering excise
taxes in the amount of $89,026.09.18 Because the search was con-
ducted pursuant to a defective warrant, the evidence was subse-
quently suppressed at the state criminal proceeding. 9 With the excep-
tion of the cash, which had been levied upon by the IRS, the items
seized were ordered returned. 0 Janis filed suit for a refund of the
cash, and the government counterclaimed for the balance of the
assessment.
2
'
The issue as framed by the Court was a narrow one: "Is evidence
seized by a state criminal law enforcement officer in good faith, but
nonetheless unconstitutionally, inadmissible in a civil proceeding by
or against the United States?" 22 In answering this question in the
13. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
14. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
15. Id. at 437. The evidence consisted of $4940 in cash and wagering records. Id.
at 436.
16. Id. at 434-38.
17. Id. at 436. Although there was no formal liaison arrangement and no depart-
mental policy requiring the police officer to report to the IRS, the officer not only
reported the arrest, but also assisted the agent in analyzing the wagering records. Id.
18. Id. at 437. The amount was computed by determining the average daily gross
proceeds for the five-day period covered by the seized materials and multiplying by
the period of police surveillance. Id.
19. Id. at 437-38. The warrant was held invalid under Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969). 428 U.S. at 437-38.
20. 428 U.S. at 438.
21. Id. The suit was filed after Janis' claim for refund was dishonored by the IRS.
Id.
22. Id. at 434. At present it remains unsettled whether the goal of deterrence
mandates the exclusion in criminal proceedings of evidence illegally seized by offi-
cials acting in good faith. This question may be resolved by the Court's decision in
State v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376 (1981), reargument ordered, 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982),
expected in this Term. This proposed good faith exception has been the subject of
much discussion. See, e.g., Uviller, The Acquisition of Evidence for Criminal Prose-
cution: Some Constitutional Premises and Practices in Transition, 35 Vand. L. Rev.
501, 507-17 (1982); justice in the Eighties: The Exclusionary Rule and the Principle
1983] 1023
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negative, the Court first reaffirmed deterrence of unlawful police
conduct as the prime, if not sole, purpose of the exclusionary rule.23
Applying the balance of interests test developed in United States v.
Calandra,24 the Court stated that the marginal additional deterrence
that might result from exclusion in the tax proceeding was so slight
that it could not outweigh the great societal cost of excluding this
highly relevant evidence. 2
5
The factors relied upon by the Court in striking this balance are
unclear. The Court seemingly placed heavy reliance on the fact that
the seizing officials and the agency seeking to use the evidence were
agents of different sovereigns. 26 The Court, however, undermined the
importance of this intersovereign distinction by specifically refusing to
of Judicial Integrity, 65 Judicature 354, 359 (1982). Whether or not a good faith
exception is created by the Court, the issue discussed in this Note will remain, for
clearly not all violations of the fourth amendment are technical violations made in
good faith. A classic example of a search conducted in bad faith is found in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389
(1971). This search was conducted by federal agents some fifty years after the
decision in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) introduced the exclusionary
rule into federal prosecutions. It is apparent that the problem of bad faith searches
has not been, nor is likely to be, eradicated. For an enumeration of various bad faith
searches, see cases cited in United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
326-33 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
23. 428 U.S. at 446 (citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536-39 (1975));
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). The Janis Court stated: "The
[exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-
by removing the incentive to disregard it." 428 U.S. at 443 n.12. (quoting Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). In addition, the Janis Court clearly rele-
gated the judicial integrity justification for the rule to a minor role. 428 U.S. at 458
n.35. This is in line with the Court's reasoning in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974), in which the personal right theory had already been abandoned. Id. at
348.
24. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
25. 428 U.S. at 453-54. The Janis Court acknowledged that the deterrent effect
of the rule has never been established with empirical certainty, and that it knew of no
study on the "possible deterrent effect of excluding evidence in a civil proceeding."
Id. at 452 n.22. The actual deterrent effect of the rule is indeed unclear and has been
the subject of much debate. Although expressing doubts about the rule's effect, the
Court as yet has declined to abandon the rule and its deterrence rationale. For a
discussion of the effectiveness of the rule as a deterrent, see Oaks, supra note 3, at
678-736; Quick, Attitudinal Aspects of Police Compliance with Procedural Due
Process, 6 Am. J. Crim. L. 25, 28-48 (1978). Some commentators have suggested that
new evidence indicates the success of the rule as a deterrent. See Canon, Is The
Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? New Data and A Plea Against A Precipitous
Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681, 701 (1974); Geller, Is the Evidence in on the Exclusion-
ary Rule?, 67 A.B.A. J. 1642, 1642-44 (1981); Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an
'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 Judicature
66, 70-73 (1978).
26. See 428 U.S. at 455-59.
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consider whether the exclusionary rule should be extended in the event
of an intrasovereign violation. 27
The Court was also influenced by the purely civil nature of the
proceeding. It distinguished this case from the quasi-criminal actions
to which the exclusionary rule had been extended.2 8 Justice Stewart,
in his dissenting opinion, was also swayed by the nature of the pro-
ceeding, but toward the opposite conclusion. He concluded that the
wagering excise tax provisions involved rendered the proceeding
quasi-criminal in nature, and therefore he would have excluded the
illegally seized evidence. 29
B. The Aftermath
Thus, the Janis decision did not make clear whether the identity of
the sovereign, the nature of the proceeding, or a combination of
factors persuaded the Court not to extend the exclusionary rule. As a
result, some courts have read the majority opinion and Stewart's
dissent as a refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to subsequent civil
proceedings, except those of a quasi-criminal nature.30 Others have
relied on extensive references in Janis to the intersovereign nature of
the violation and have formulated a test based upon an intersovereign
versus intrasovereign distinction. Accordingly, these courts extend the
rule to civil cases only when the seizing officials and the proponents of
the evidence are agents of the same sovereign.3 1 Still other courts
27. Id. at 456 & n.31.
28. Id. at 447 & n.17.
29. Id. at 461-63 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, with whom Justice
Marshall concurred, also dissented on the grounds that the exclusionary rule is "a
necessary and inherent constitutional ingredient of the protections of the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan reiterated his
objections voiced in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355-67 (1974) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 556-62 (1975) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). 428 U.S. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting). At least one other
court and several commentators have argued that wagering excise tax statutes are
quasi-criminal in nature. See, e.g., United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180, 182
(N.D. Ohio 1966); Comment, The United States v. Janis-The Return of the "Silver
Platter Doctrine," 12 New Eng. L. Rev. 789, 810-13 (1977); Note, The Fourth
Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule in Civil Cases, 43 Den. L.J. 511, 515 (1966);
Note, Polishing the Tarnished Silver Platter Doctrine: The Effect of Janis v. United
States on Intersovereign Fourth Amendment Violations, 12 Tulsa L.J. 357, 378-79
(1976).
30. See, e.g., Romano v. Home Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp 191, 193 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(dictum); United States v. One 1976 Cadillac Seville, 477 F. Supp. 879, 883 (E.D.
Mich. 1979); Backos v. United States, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 16,350, at 85,936
(E.D. Mich. 1978); Ekelund v. Secretary of Commerce, 418 F. Supp. 102, 106
(E.D.N.Y. 1976); Lamartiniere v. Department of Employment Sec., 372 So. 2d 690,
692-93 (La. App.), writ denied, 375 So. 2d 945 (La. 1979).
31. See, e.g., Vander Linden v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 693, 697 (S.D. Iowa
1980); Velasco v. IRS, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9590, at 84,924 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
1983] 1025
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interpreting Janis find neither the identity of the sovereign nor the
nature of the proceeding to be determinative. These courts opt instead
for a case-by-case application of the balance of interests test, weighing
the deterrent value of exclusion in a particular proceeding against the
societal cost of exclusion. 32
The applicability of the exclusionary rule to subsequent civil pro-
ceedings is brought to issue in a wide variety of contexts. 33 For exam-
ple, as in Janis, the IRS often seeks to use evidence seized in gambling
or narcotics raids as a basis for an assessment of unpaid taxes. 34 Other
government actions include narcotics addict commitment proceed-
ings,35 -state professional disciplinary actions36 and wardship proceed-
ings.37 Among the most common suits instituted by private litigants
are personal injury actions, 38 insurance actions in which the insurer
raises a defense of arson 39 and wrongful death actions in which a
party seeks to introduce illegally obtained evidence on the issue of
negligence. 40
The above examples are by no means exhaustive. Indeed, given the
myriad of administrative actions that may be brought by state and
federal agencies, 41 and the increasing reliance in private actions upon
Gaston v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9126, at 86,087 (N.D. Ga.
1978); Guzzetta v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 173, 175 n.2 (1982).
32. See supra note 11.
33. State courts have wrestled with this issue for years. A number of cases are
based primarily on state constitutional protections. See, e.g., Carlisle v. State ex rel.
Trammel, 276 Ala. 436, 438, 163 So. 2d 596, 598 (1964); Carson v. State ex rel.
Price, 221 Ga. 299, 303-04, 144 S.E.2d 384, 386-87 (1965); Board of Selectmen v.
Municipal Court, 373 Mass. 783, 785-86, 369 N.E.2d 1145, 1146-47 (1977); Kassner
v. Fremont Mut. Ins. Co., 47 Mich. App. 264, 266-67, 209 N.W.2d 490, 492 (1973);
Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 437-38, 93 N.W.2d 281, 285-86 (1958).
34. See, e.g., Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307, 309 (2d Cir. 1982); Vander
Linden v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 693, 696-97 (S.D. Iowa 1980).
35. See, e.g., People v. Winfrey, 13 Cal. App. 3d 818, 92 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970);
People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968), overruled
on other grounds, People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 641 n.8, 566 P.2d 228, 234 n.8,
139 Cal. Rptr. 594, 600 n.8 (1977).
36. See, e.g., Emslie v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 210, 520 P.2d 991, 113 Cal. Rptr.
175 (1974); People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1981).
37. See, e.g., In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390
(1978); In re Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1976), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Potter v. Department of Social Servs., 431 U.S. 911 (1977).
38. See, e.g., Tanuvasa v. City and County of Honolulu, 626 P.2d 1175 (Hawaii
Ct. App. 1981); Herndon v. City of Ithaca, 43 A.D.2d 634, 349 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1973)
(mem.), appeal dismissed, 35 N.Y.2d 956, 324 N.E.2d 555, 365 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1974).
39. See, e.g., Honeycutt v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Romano v. Home Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ga. 1980);
Kassner v. Fremont Mut. Ins. Co., 47 Mich. App. 264, 209 N.W.2d 490 (1973).
40. See, e.g., McNitt v. Citco Drilling Co., 397 Mich. 384, 245 N.W.2d 18
(1976); Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958).
41. See generally Note, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule in Adminis-
trative Adjudicatory Proceedings, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 343 (1981) (arguing that different
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evidence seized by the government,42 the frequency with which this
issue arises will only increase. Thus, there is a compelling need for a
cogent, single test of admissibility.
II. THE VARIED INTERPRErATIONS OF JANIS
A. The Purely Civil Versus Quasi-Criminal Test
1. Constructing the Test
In the aftermath of Janis, characterizing the nature of the proceed-
ing as either purely civil or quasi-criminal has become crucial to some
courts. 43 This quasi-criminal/civil distinction has a history pre-dating
Janis. Its roots may be found primarily in a 1965 Supreme Court
decision, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania.44 In Plymouth,
the Court extended the exclusionary rule to a civil forfeiture proceed-
ing, reasoning that the proceeding, though civil in form, was criminal
in substance. 4. Plymouth, in turn, relied heavily on a pre-exclusionary
rule case, Boyd v. United States.46 Boyd involved the compulsory
production of a defendant's private papers in an action for the forfeit-
ure of goods for failure to comply with import regulations. 47 The Boyd
Court determined that the forfeiture proceeding was quasi-criminal in
nature and held the admission of the illegally seized papers48 to be
within the fifth amendment proscription against compelling testi-
mony. 49 Although Boyd was primarily a fifth amendment case, the
types of administrative proceedings should be treated differently for the purpose of
the exclusionary rule) [hereinafter cited as Administrative Proceedings].
42. See, e.g., Honeycutt v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 340, 344-48 (7th Cir.)
(insurance suit), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Romano v. Home Ins. Co., 490
F. Supp. 191, 193-94 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (same); Tanuvasa v. City and County of
Honolulu, 626 P.2d 1175, 1180-81 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981) (personal injury); Lebel
v. Swincieki, 354 Mich. 427, 434-41, 93 N.W.2d 281, 284-88 (1958) (wrongful
death); Gilbert v. Leach, 62 Mich. App. 722, 724-30, 233 N.W.2d 840, 842-45 (1975)
(wrongful death), afJ'd, 397 Mich. 384, 245 N.W.2d 18 (1976); Herndon v. City of
Ithaca, 43 A.D.2d 634, 635-37, 349 N.Y.S.2d 227, 231 (personal injury), appeal
dismissed, 35 N.Y.2d 956, 324 N.E.2d 555, 365 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1974).
43. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
44. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
45. Id. at 702-03.
46. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
47. Id. at 617-18.
48. Id. at 633-35. The Court found that the issuance of the subpoena duces
tecum constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment.
Id. at 634-35. This part of the Court's holding has been implicitly modified by
subsequent cases, which have held some subpoenas not to be searches and seizures
within the meaning of the amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 445-46 & n.8 (1976); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,
194-95 (1946).
49. 116 U.S. at 633-35.
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quasi-criminal/civil distinction created therein has been invoked in
many subsequent fourth amendment decisions. 50
By extending the rule to quasi-criminal actions, the Plymouth
Court determined that the deterrent value of exclusion in quasi-crimi-
nal cases is substantial. 51 Courts following this lead have excluded
illegally seized evidence in all quasi-criminal cases,5 2 but have refused
to consider applying the exclusionary rule to purely civil proceed-
ings.53
50. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696
(1965) (forfeiture proceeding held quasi-criminal; extended the rule); Honeycutt v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 340, 348 (7th Cir.) (action by insured against insurer held
purely civil; refused to extend the rule), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Romano
v. Home Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 191, 193 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (dictum) (same); United
States v. One 1976 Cadillac Seville, 477 F. Supp. 879, 883 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(forfeiture proceeding held quasi-criminal; extended the rule); Iowa v. Union As-
phalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 407 (S.D. Iowa 1968) (antitrust suit held
quasi-criminal; extended the rule), aff'd sub nom. as to exclusionary rule issue,
Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969), aff'd as to attorney'sfees
issue, 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180, 183-
84 (N.D. Ohio 1966) (enforcement of wagering excise tax provisions held quasi-
criminal; extended the rule); Rinderknecht v. Maricopa County Employees Merit
Sys., 21 Ariz. App. 419, 421, 520 P.2d 332, 334-35 (employee disciplinary proceeding
held quasi-criminal; extended the rule), vacated after settlement, 111 Ariz. 174, 526
P.2d 713 (1974); Lamartiniere v. Department of Employment Sec., 372 So. 2d 690,
692-93 (La. Ct. App.) (unemployment compensation proceeding held purely civil;
refused to extend the rule), writ denied, 375 So. 2d 945 (La. 1979).
51. The deterrence rationale made its appearance as early as Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1949), overruled, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Thus, by
the time the Supreme Court decided One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693 (1965), the notion of deterring official misconduct pervaded Supreme Court
opinions regarding extensions of the exclusionary rule. This concern was implicit in
Plymouth, in which the Court was influenced by the close relationship between the
civil forfeiture proceeding and the related criminal offense. The same evidence that
the state was precluded from using in the criminal case served as the sole basis for the
forfeiture. Id. at 697-701. The Court was concerned that if the rule was not extended
to the proceeding in question, an opening would be left for abuse. See id. at 697. The
state could forego a criminal prosecution and utilize the tainted evidence to pursue a
civil forfeiture instead. In the case at bar, the civil penalty was in fact more onerous
than the criminal punishment. Id. at 700-01. The Court concluded that "[it would
be anomalous indeed, under these circumstances, to hold that in the criminal pro-
ceeding the illegally seized evidence is excludable, while in the forfeiture proceeding,
requiring the determination that the criminal law has been violated, the same
evidence would be admissible." Id. at 701.
52. See, e.g., Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 406-07
(S.D. Iowa 1968), aff'd sub nom. as to exclusionary rule issue, Standard Oil Co. v.
Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969), aff'd as to attorney's fees issue, 409 F.2d 1239
(8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180, 183-84 (N.D. Ohio 1966);
Rinderknecht v. Maricopa County Employees Merit Sys., 21 Ariz. App. 419, 422,
520 P.2d 332, 335, vacated after settlement, 111 Ariz. 174, 526 P.2d 713 (1974).
53. See, e.g., Honeycutt v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Romano v. Home Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
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Although a great many of the cases invoking the quasi-criminal/
civil distinction are pre-Janis,54 their precedential value appears un-
disturbed.5 5 At least one court has specifically read Janis as reaffirm-
ing the Plymouth rule.56 Other post-Janis decisions have indicated in
dicta57 a willingness to continue the Plymouth approach as the test in
all civil suits. No doubt the nod toward the quasi-criminal classifica-
tion made by both the Janis majority and Justice Stewart support the
reading of Janis as preserving the viability of Plymouth.58
Although the quasi-criminal/civil distinction is utilized most fre-
quently in actions in which the government is a party, 59 it has by no
(dictum); Lamartiniere v. Department of Employment Sec., 372 So. 2d 690 (La. Ct.
App.), writ denied, 375 So. 2d 945 (La. 1979).
54. See, e.g., Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 986 (1969); Knoll Assocs. Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968); Powell
v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc.,
281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968), afJ'd sub nom. as to exclusionary rule issue,
Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969), aff'd as to attorney's fees
issue, 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D.
Ohio 1966); Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
55. Some of these cases were cited without criticism by the Janis Court. United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 & n.30 (1976). Their continued validity may be
inferred from the majority's distinction of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylva-
nia, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), see 428 U.S. at 447 & n.17, and the dissent's argument that
the tax provisions were sufficiently quasi-criminal within the meaning of Plymouth,
id. at 460-64. Additionally, at least one Supreme Court decision since Janis has also
acknowledged the rule's extension to quasi-criminal proceedings. See United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 255 (1980).
56. In United States v. One 1976 Cadillac Seville, 477 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Mich.
1979), the court was forced to consider the continued validity of the Plymouth quasi-
criminal exception in a civil forfeiture proceeding. An agent of the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration searched a suspected drug courier and seized a pound of heroin.
The seizure was found to be illegal and the evidence was suppressed in the govern-
ment's criminal proceeding. Id. at 880. The government, nonetheless, pursued a civil
forfeiture action against the vehicle involved in the incident, alleging that the vehicle
had been used to facilitate the transportation of controlled substances. Probable
cause for the forfeiture was based solely upon the illegally seized evidence. Id. at 880-
81. While acknowledging the recent cutbacks in the application of the exclusionary
rule, the court excluded the evidence, stating that the exclusionary rule still applies to
"bar a forfeiture based on illegally obtained evidence." Id. at 883 (citations omitted).
Significantly, the court relied on Janis as specifically reapproving Plymouth. Id.
57. See, e.g., Savina Home Indus. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1362 &
n.6 (10th Cir. 1979); Breen v. United States, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9132, at
83,108 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
58. 428 U.S. at 447 n.17, id. at 461-63 (Stewart, J., dissenting). (majority
distinguished case at bar from quasi-criminal action in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), while Justice Stewart, dissenting, found the
quasi-criminal classification to be applicable).
59. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965);
United States v. One 1976 Cadillac Seville, 477 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Mich 1979);
United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966); Rinderknecht v. Mari-
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means been confined to government litigation. In private civil litiga-
tions, the use of the Plymouth rule is best exemplified by a pre-Janis
case, Honeycutt v. Aetna Insurance Co.6 0 In Honeycutt, the Seventh
Circuit upheld the admission of illegally seized evidence in an action
on a fire insurance policy brought by the insured."' The insurer had
introduced the evidence in support of a defense of arson. The court
acknowledged the rule's applicability to quasi-criminal actions but
reasoned that "[tihe rationale of Boyd itself seems to foreclose the
applicability of the exclusionary rule to civil actions between private
parties. ' 62 Clearly, the court reasoned that an action between private
parties could not be quasi-criminal. Since Janis, courts following Ho-
neycutt's lead have similarly found the quasi-criminal/civil distinction
persuasive in deciding whether to admit illegally seized evidence in
private civil actions. 3
2. Misuse of Boyd
Viewing the quasi-criminal classification from a historical perspec-
tive, however, it is clear that courts should no longer blindly adhere to
it in fourth amendment cases. Courts utilizing this approach rely
heavily on Boyd's recognition of quasi-criminal actions. But the Boyd
decision rests primarily on the constitutional prohibition of compelled
testimony in criminal cases.6 4 In that case, the compulsory production
of private papers created a close intermingling of the fourth and fifth
amendments.6 5 This intermingling occurred because the single
copa County Employees Merit Sys., 21 Ariz. App. 419, 520 P.2d 332, vacated after
settlement, 111 Ariz. 174, 526 P.2d 713 (1974).
60. 510 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
61. Id. at 348.
62. id.
63. See, e.g., Romano v. Home Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 191, 193 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(dictum); Lamartiniere v. Department of Employment See., 372 So. 2d 690, 693-99
(La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 375 So. 2d 945 (La. 1979).
64. The Janis Court in fact cites Boyd only as a fifth amendment case. See 428
U.S. at 443. Justice Miller, in his concurring opinion in Boyd, argued that the case
was a criminal one within the scope of the fifth amendment, but found no search and
seizure. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 639 (1886) (Miller, J., concurring). The
view taken by the Boyd majority opinion classifying the subpoena duces tecum as an
unreasonable search and seizure has been undermined by subsequent cases. See
Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitu-
tional Analysis, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 379, 416-17 (1976). For a discussion of the current
application of the fourth amendment to subpoenae duces tecum, see J.W. Hall,
Search and Seizure, §§ 12:2-:5 (1982).
65. The Boyd Court relied heavily upon the close relationship between the two
amendments. 116 U.S. at 633. In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693 (1965), Justice Black maintained the position that the fourth amendment
alone was insufficient to mandate the exclusion of evidence. He argued for exclusion
when the two amendments intertwine or merge as in the Boyd case. Id. at 703-05
(Black, J., dissenting).
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action-the forced production of self-incriminating documents-vio-
lated the fifth amendment, by compelling Boyd to testify against
himself, as well as the fourth amendment, as an unreasonable seizure
of evidenceA6 At the time Boyd was decided, the mere existence of a
fourth amendment violation was insufficient to exclude evidence.6 7 In
contrast, the very language of the fifth amendment prohibits any
person from being "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."68
The Boyd Court's determination that the forfeiture was quasi-crim-
inal was essential only to bring the case within the fifth amendment's
protection and thus exclude the evidence.69 Further, even if a fourth
amendment violation alone could have resulted in exclusion, it was
not apparent then, as it is now, that the fourth amendment protects
against government intrusions for civil purposes. 70 Courts that make
the quasi-criminal/civil distinction are thus implicitly relying on a
case that involved a unique set of facts and was decided in light of law
that may not be entirely applicable today. Moreover, they fail to
adequately address the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule, that
of deterrence.
3. A Questionable Distinction
As the area of fourth amendment law continues to develop, the
distinction between civil and quasi-criminal proceedings should be of
diminishing importance in the fourth amendment area. The distinc-
tion rests on the outdated assumption that only criminal law enforce-
ment officials conduct searches. Today many searches and seizures are
conducted by administrative agencies. 71 These administrative searches
66. 116 U.S. at 634-35. Today, however, lawfully compelling an individual to
produce incriminating documents does not constitute a fifth amendment violation.
See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 251-54 (1980); Andresen v. Mary-
land, 427 U.S. 463, 472 (1976).
67. Until Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), evidence illegally seized in
violation of the fourth amendment was freely admissible in both federal and state
courts under the common-law view that the method used to procure the evidence did
not affect its admissibility. See J.W. Hall, supra note 64, § 20:2, at 577.
68. U.S. Const. amend. V.
69. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 251-53 (1980); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443 (1976); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472 & n.6
(1976); Clark, supra note 64, at 414-17.
70. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Supreme Court
extended the fourth amendment warrant requirement to administrative searches of
residential property. Id. at 534. The Court made it clear that the fourth amendment
protections against government intrusions were not limited to persons suspected of
criminal activity. Id. at 530-31. In See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the
Court extended this protection to civil administrative searches of commercial proper-
ties as well. Id. at 545.
71. See Administrative Proceedings, supra note 41, at 358-59.
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are unquestionably subject to the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment. 72 Because the exclusionary rule is merely a judicially
created tool to enforce compliance with the fourth amendment by
deterring official misconduct, it should logically apply to these per-
haps purely civil proceedings.
On a practical level, the Plymouth approach poses a considerable
risk of collateral inquiry. Much time and energy is wasted in deter-
mining whether a particular proceeding is sufficiently penal in na-
ture. This results in hair-splitting and uncertainty.7 3 Officials may be
allowed to profit from their own wrong simply because the court
determines that the proceeding lacks sufficient indicia of a criminal
action to warrant exclusion. Moreover, application of this approach to
civil actions between private parties is inapposite; rarely will a court
find such an action quasi-criminal in nature.7 4
B. The Intersovereign/Intrasovereign Test
Some courts have interpreted the Janis opinion as implicitly endors-
ing an intrasovereign rule of exclusion. 75 Such courts place particular
reliance upon the Janis Court's discussion of Suarez v. Commis-
sioner.76 Suarez presented a situation almost identical to that in
Janis.77 The Suarez court, though, chose to extend the exclusionary
72. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The Camara Court
reasoned that "[i]t is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is
suspected of criminal behavior." Id. at 530 (footnote omitted). It must be noted,
however, that administrative warrants may be issued on a showing of probable cause
that is far less stringent than its counterpart for criminal searches. Administrative
searches are governed by a standard of "reasonableness" and a warrant may issue
upon a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conduct-
ing an. . . inspection" have been met. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320
(1978) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)); Hall, supra
note 64, § 11.1, at 351-52; id. § 11.3, at 357.
73. Compare Backos v. United States, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 16,350 (E.D.
Mich. 1978) (wagering excise tax provisions not quasi-criminal) with United States v.
Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966) (wagering excise tax provisions are quasi-
criminal).
74. One possibility is a private antitrust action. See Iowa v. Union Asphalt &
Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968), aff'd sub nom. as to exclusionary
rule issue, Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969), aff'd as to
attorney's fees issue, 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969).
75. See, e.g., Vander Linden v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 693, 697 (S.D. Iowa
1980); Velasco v. IRS, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9590, at 84,924 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Gaston v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9126, at 86,087 (N.D. Ga.
1978); Guzzetta v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 173, 180-84 (1982).
76. 58 T.C. 792 (1972).
77. Suarez, like Janis, involved an intersovereign violation. Id. at 794-98. Evi-
dence had been illegally seized by Florida police investigating illegal abortions at the
defendant's clinic. Id. at 794. The IRS obtained the information after hearing of the
raid from the news media. Id. at 798.
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rule to a civil tax proceeding. 78 The Janis Court criticized Suarez, first
on the ground that the court failed to focus on the deterrent purpose of
the rule, and second, because "the court did not distinguish between
intersovereign and intrasovereign uses of unconstitutionally seized ma-
terials. ' 79 This and similar language in Janis, emphasizing this distinc-
tion,80 has led some courts to apply the exclusionary rule only in cases
of intrasovereign violations.
One of the most recent cases following this line of analysis is Vander
Linden v. United States."' In Vander Linden, one of the plaintiffs had
turned over evidence to an IRS agent under the belief that it would be
used for a civil tax audit.8 2 In fact, the agent's purpose was to investi-
gate "civil and/or criminal income tax charges based on unreported
income from illegal drug activities and ...to uncover drug-related
activities.'183 Because the plaintiff had been deceived as to the true
purpose of the agent's investigation, the consent to produce the evi-
dence was deemed involuntary.8 4 Accordingly, the evidence was sup-
pressed at the criminal proceeding brought against him.8 5
The IRS then used the evidence as a basis for an assessment.86 The
plaintiffs moved to suppress the evidence and to quash the tax assess-
ments, the civil fraud penalties and the interest based thereon. Al-
though characterizing the issue as unresolved, this court also sup-
pressed the evidence in the civil proceeding, 7 finding "great
guidance" in Janis.8  Because of the intrasovereign violation pre-
sented, the court distinguished the facts in Janis. 9 The court relied on
Janis' recognition of a line of cases in which evidence was suppressed
in intrasovereign situations.9 0 Armed with these precedents, the Van-
der Linden court interpreted Janis as a determination that "the 'deter-
78. Id. at 814.
79. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 457 (1976).
80. Id. at 455-60. The Court also criticized Janis, the respondent, for failing to
distinguish between cases involving intersovereign situations and intrasovereign situ-
ations. Id. at 455. The Court further noted that the "seminal" cases extending the
rule involved intrasovereign violations. Id. at 456.
81. 502 F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Iowa 1980).
82. Id. at 694-95.
83. Id. at 695-96 (quoting United States v. Vander Linden, Cr. No. 76-29 (S.D.
Iowa 1976).
84. 502 F. Supp. at 696.
85. Id. at 694.
86. Id. at 696.
87. Id. at 698.
88. Id. at 697.
89. Id.
90. The following cases were among those cited without criticism by the Janis
Court, 428 U.S. at 455 & n.30: Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579, 585-86 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969); Knoll Assocs., Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530,
535-37 (7th Cir. 1968); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 640-41 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
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rent effect' [of the exclusionary rule] in an 'intrasovereign' situation
would be furthered by excluding illegally obtained evidence in subse-
quent civil trial proceedings."-91
As an analysis of Janis, however, this interpretation is questionable.
Although the Janis Court did remark on the intersovereign nature of
the violation in question, 92 nothing in the opinion indicates that the
Court intended this fact to be decisive. To the contrary, the Court's
refusal to consider the exclusionary rule's applicability in the event of
an intrasovereign use of evidence indicates that the identity of the
sovereign was only one factor in determining the deterrent value of
exclusion. Further, all the cases cited in Janis as having applied the
rule to intrasovereign situations involved searches and seizures by
officers of the same agency seeking to use the evidence in subsequent
civil proceedings, 93 suggesting that the identity of the agency, and not
the sovereign, was dispositive.
Additionally, the history of the exclusionary rule provides little
basis for distinguishing between intrasovereign and intersovereign vio-
lations. Certainly under the outdated judicial integrity and personal
right theories such a distinction would be irrelevant.9 4 Even today,
Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 407-08 (S.D. Iowa 1968),
aff'd sub nom. as to exclusionary rule issue, Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171
(8th Cir. 1969), aff'd as to attorney'sfees issue, 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180, 182-84 (N.D. Ohio 1966); Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F.
Supp. 843, 846-48 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
91. 502 F. Supp. at 697. Interestingly, the Vander Linden case was not only an
intrasovereign situation, but one in which the very same division of the Internal
Revenue Service committed the illegal search, and sought to use the evidence in both
criminal and civil proceedings. Id. at 695-96.
92. See 428 U.S. at 455-58.
93. Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579, 585-86 (2d Cir.) (evidence seized
by IRS agents for purpose of criminal prosecution excluded in subsequent civil tax
action), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969); Knoll Assocs., Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530,
535-36 (7th Cir. 1968) (evidence seized at the behest of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) excluded in FTC hearing on discriminatory practices); Powell v. Zuckert,
366 F.2d 634, 639-41 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (evidence seized by the United States Air
Force and Japanese police excluded in Air Force employee's discharge hearing); Iowa
v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 407-08 (S.D. Iowa 1968)
(evidence seized by state attorney general ostensibly for purpose of consumer fraud
prosecution suppressed in civil antitrust action brought by state attorney general),
afJ'd sub nom. as to exclusionary rule issue, Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171
(8th Cir. 1969), afj'd as to attorney'sfees issue, 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180, 182 (N.D. Ohio 1966) (evidence seized by IRS
suppressed in civil tax proceeding).
94. Under both the personal right and judicial integrity theories it is clear that
the evidence could not be introduced against the search victim whether the violation
was intersovereign or intrasovereign. In an opinion that best exemplified these theo-
ries, Justice Holmes declared that "[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisi-
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under the deterrence rationale, the argument for such a distinction is
substantially weakened by the existence of an intersovereign ban on
illegally seized evidence in criminal prosecutions.95 Rather than con-
centrating on the identity of the sovereign, the ban focuses on the
demonstrable common interest of law enforcement officials in crimi-
nal prosecutions.9 6
As a practical matter, an approach that relies upon an inter/intra-
sovereign distinction is easy to apply in subsequent civil proceedings.
But its analysis is superficial and in some instances bears little rational
relationship to effectuating the goal of deterrence. The test errs by
failing to focus its attention on the identity and interests of the seizing
officer. Thus, it tends to be overbroad and may result in the unneces-
sary exclusion of concededly relevant and reliable evidence.
Moreover, it may allow agents of one sovereign to benefit from
illegal seizures by agents of another sovereign, merely because the
search victim fails to present sufficient evidence of a formal, coopera-
tive arrangement between the two agencies.97 This test ignores the
tion of evidence in a certain way is. . .not merely [that the] evidence so acquired
shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all." Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
95. The use of evidence illegally seized by state officials in the federal courts,
known as the "silver platter doctrine," was banned by the Supreme Court in Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960), overruling, Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S.
74 (1949). The term "silver platter doctrine" originated in Justice Frankfurter's
plurality opinion in Lustig: "The crux of that doctrine is that a search is a search by a
federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence
secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver
platter." 338 U.S. at 78-79.
96. In creating the intersovereign ban in criminal prosecutions, the Court had
determined that the seizing officials and the officials seeking to use the evidence, both
criminal law enforcement agents, have a demonstrable interest in the criminal
prosecution. This link in itself is sufficiently probative of a substantial deterrent effect
to warrant exclusion of the evidence. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 457-58
(1976); see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
97. Whether this level of proof is necessary remains unclear. The Janis decision,
however, implies that proof of a formal agreement between the agencies or actual
participation in the illegal search by the proponent of the evidence may be required.
The Court rendered its decision based on the assumption that there was no "federal
participation" in the illegal search or agreement between the parties. 428 U.S. at 455
& n.31. Notably, in making this statement the Janis Court cited to two early
decisions, id. at 455 n.31, Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949), overruled,
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) and Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28
(1927). Both cases formulated rules for defining "federal participation" during the
years when the "silver platter doctrine" remained in force. In Byars, a federal agent
was asked to participate in the actual search, id at 32-33, and in Lustig, the federal
agent, while not participating throughout the entire search, joined the state officials
before the search was actually concluded and "share[d] in the critical examination of
the uncovered articles as the physical search proceeded," 338 U.S. at 78. It can also
be inferred from the lanis decision that a formal agreement imposing a duty or
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many instances of intersovereign cooperation, and also assumes,
rather naively given the nature of bureaucracies, that all agents of the
same sovereign have the same goals and thus, "stick together." 98
Moreover, by the very nature of this test, it is inapplicable to actions
brought by private parties. Thus, it is deficient because it fails to
provide any guidance for the ever-growing use of illegally seized
evidence in private cases.
C. The Balance Of Interests Approach
In United States v. Calandra,99 the Supreme Court laid the ground-
work for contemporary exclusionary rule analysis by stating that the
"prime purpose [of the rule] is to deter future unlawful police con-
duct. ' ' x° Calandra restricted the rule's application to "those areas
where its remedial objectives are . . . most efficaciously served."'' 1
These areas are determined by balancing, as the Janis Court did,102
the deterrent value of exclusion against the potential harm of losing
relevant evidence. 103
A number of federal and state courts applying the balance of inter-
ests formula have refrained from placing undue weight on either the
nature of the proceeding or on the identity of the sovereign. 10 4 In-
stead, these courts have considered all the relevant factors presented
and have applied the balance on a case-by-case basis. Some factors
that have tipped the balance in favor of admitting illegally seized
responsibility upon the seizing agent to turn the evidence over to the proponent of the
evidence is required. See 428 U.S. at 455. This interpretation is consistent with the
result in Guzzetta v. Commissioner, 78 T.G. 173 (1982), in which the court denied
exclusion of illegally seized evidence in a civil tax proceeding, even though the
existence of a secret, though informal, liaison between the two agencies was proven.
78 T.C. at 174. The liaison relationship was established before the search was
conducted. The purpose of this liaison was "to establish a vehicle for [the IRS] to
obtain information relevant to potential tax crimes," but the New York Police De-
partment transferred files on suspects to the IRS at its discretion. Id.
98. The existence of intrasovereign bureaucratic rivalry has been recognized.
Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1982). Just as clear are many
instances of intersovereign cooperation. See Vander Linden v. United States, 502 F.
Supp. 693, 694-96 (S.D. Iowa 1980). In Vander Linden, the IRS participated in an
intersovereign multi-agency drug law enforcement program. Id. at 694-95.
99. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
100. Id. at 347.
101. Id. at 348.
102. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976).
103. 414 U.S. at 349.
104. See, e.g., Jonas v. City of Atlanta, 647 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 1981); Emslie
v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 210, 227-29, 520 P.2d 991, 1001-02, 113 Cal. Rptr. 175, 184-
85 (1974); Governing Bd. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 549-50, 111 Cal. Rptr.
724, 726 (1974); People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745, 748 (Colo. 1981).
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
evidence in civil cases are the merely technical nature of the viola-
tion,105 the need to protect children from morally unfit teachers'06 and
parents,'0 7 and the duty to protect the public from unscrupulous
lawyers. 0" Factors that have militated in favor of exclusion include
the highly prejudicial effect of the evidence in a personal injury
action 09 and outrageous police conduct.110
While these courts correctly refuse to make any one factor determi-
native, their application of the Calandra balance of interests test may
lead to inconsistent and sometimes inequitable results. The case-by-
case approach had its genesis in Calandra, a case that considered
extending the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings."' The
Court balanced the potential injury to the role and functions of a
grand jury against the deterrent effect of excluding the evidence." 2
Determining that the important societal functions served by grand
jury proceedings outweighed the marginal additional deterrent effect
of excluding the evidence, the Court refused to extend the rule. 1 3
Calandra's balance, however, is incomplete. It fails to provide
guidelines for determining the potential deterrent effect. Rather than
assessing the degree of deterrence with any certainty, the Calandra
Court merely assumed that "[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which
might be achieved . . .is uncertain at best."' 4 The Court was justi-
fied in assuming at least some deterrence on the facts presented. A
grand jury proceeding is an essential step in the prosecutorial process
for which evidence is seized." 5 Because the seizing officers intended
105. See Hartwell Excavating Co. v. Dunlop, 537 F.2d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir.
1976).
106. See Governing Bd. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 550-51, 111 Cal. Rptr.
724, 727 (1974).
107. See In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 614-15, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390,
394 (1978).
108. People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745, 747 (Colo. 1981).
109. Tanuvasa v. City and County of Honolulu, 626 P.2d 1175, 1181 (Hawaii Ct.
App. 1981).
110. See People ex rel. Difanis v. Boston, 92 Ill. App. 3d 962, 966-67, 416 N.E.2d
333, 337 (1981).
111. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 339 (1974).
112. Id. at 347-49.
113. Id. at 351-55.
114. Id. at 351.
115. The presentation of evidence to a grand jury is a necessary step in many
criminal prosecutions. Grand jury proceedings are, with certain exceptions, constitu-
tionally required in federal prosecutions for felonies. U.S. Const. amend. V; M.
Frankel & G. Naftales, The Grand Jury 3 (1975). In some states presentation to a
grand jury is required for all felonies. Other states require grand jury proceedings
only for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment. In the remaining states,
the prosecutor may seek either a grand jury indictment or file an information. Id. at
16.
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that the evidence be used throughout the entire process, the Court had
some basis for determining the existence of a deterrent effect.",,
Similarly, whenever evidence is seized specifically for use in a par-
ticular civil proceeding, 117 the connection between the search and the
contemplated use is sufficiently direct to assume that deterrence will
result from exclusion. Thus, in such cases, applying the Calandra
balance is sufficient. A court can adequately weigh the justifiably
assumed deterrence against the potential harm of losing relevant evi-
dence.
When the evidence is apparently seized for a purpose other than the
subsequent civil proceeding, however, the connection between the
seizing official and the contemplated use is not as easily discernible.
Therefore, the existence of any deterrence should not be presumed.
Without an accurate assessment of the potential deterrent effect, ap-
plication of the Calandra balancing formula is meaningless. Courts
may summarily dismiss the potential deterrent effect as marginal or
nonexistent, not as a result of serious inquiry, but because of general
skepticism about the rule's deterrent value." 8 With such unregulated
freedom, a court may predetermine the outcome of the balancing
process merely by manipulating the weight on the deterrence end of
the scale. Understandably, the temptation to manipulate may be
particularly great when the object of the proceeding creates sympa-
thy." 9 Thus, before the Calandra balancing formula can become
116. Since the presentation of facts to a grand jury is often a necessary step in
many criminal prosecutions, see supra note 115 and accompanying text, it is reason-
able to assume that officers who seize evidence with the hope that it will be used in
the successful prosecution of individuals for particular crimes are equally interested
in the admission of the evidence before the grand jury. The Calandra Court did not
find that police officers lacked any incentive to conduct illegal searches for the
purpose of a grand jury. Rather, the Court found that the incentive is "substantially
negated by the inadmissibility of the illegally seized evidence in a subsequent crimi-
nal prosecution of the search victim." 414 U.S. at 351.
117. See, e.g., Wong Chung Che v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 565
F.2d 166, 168-69 (1st Cir. 1977); Knoll Assocs., Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530, 533-34
(7th Cir. 1968); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 786-87 (W.D. Mich. 1975);
Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 405-06 (S.D. Iowa 1968),
aff'd sub nom. as to exclusionary rule issue, Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171
(8th Cir. 1969), aff'd as to attorney's fees issue, 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969).
118. This skepticism is evident from the majority opinion in Janis. In its discussion
of the deterrence end of the balance, the Court devoted a full eight pages to a general
discussion of its dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule and the lack of empirical
data showing the rule to be an effective deterrent. The discussion of the facts of the
case at bar was minimal. 428 U.S. at 447-54.
119. The danger is particularly great when, for example, the object of the pro-
ceeding is to protect children from unfit teachers or parents. See, e.g., In re Chris-
topher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978) (unfit parents); Governing
Bd. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 111 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1974) (unfit teachers).
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effective, guidelines are essential to ensure an accurate assessment of
the deterrent effect.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE TMADO APPROACH
The Second Circuit, in Tirado v. Commissioner,120 provided the
element necessary to adapt the Calandra balance of interests test to
subsequent civil actions. It set forth guidelines for determining the
deterrent effect of excluding evidence in a particular proceeding by
focusing on the motives of the officials who seized the challenged
evidence. 121
In Tirado, five members of a joint federal and state law enforce-
ment task force searched Tirado's apartment pursuant to a warrant. 2 2
In addition to narcotics, the agents uncovered evidence that indicated
that Tirado had undisclosed sources of income.123 The narcotics seized
served as a basis for Tirado's subsequent conviction in a state court.12 4
Shortly after the search, the seizing agents provided the IRS with the
evidence which enabled it to make a deficiency determination.12 5
Tirado petitioned the Tax Court for redetermination of the defi-
ciency, claiming that the items seized were beyond the scope of the
warrant and should have been excluded.12 The Tax Court concluded
that the warrant encompassed the items seized and refused to exclude
the evidence.127
The Second Circuit, however, in affirming the decision of the Tax
Court, did not reach the issue of the legality of the search. Instead, it
held that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable to the subsequent
civil proceeding. 12 Notably, the court was faced with an intrasover-
eign situation and was therefore required to answer the question
specifically left open by Janis. 29
The court rejected the argument that the deterrent effect of exclu-
sion is directly related to the identity of the sovereign. 30 The court
also rejected as unrelated to the issue of deterrence the view that the
exclusionary rule is per se inapplicable to civil proceedings. 131 Rather,
120. 689 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1982).
121. Id. at 310.
122. Id. at 308.
123. Id. at 308-09.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 309.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Federal narcotics agents participated in the search and the IRS later sought
to use the evidence. Id. at 308-09.
130. Id. at 313.
131. Id. at 313-14.
1983] 1039
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the court utilized the Calandra balance of interest approach,' 32 and
further, formulated specific guidelines for its application.
According to the Second Circuit, determining whether exclusion
enhances deterrence requires an assessment of the seizing officers'
motives. 33 The court stated that an "inquiry into the officers' motiva-
tion is the fundamental issue in translating the idea of deterrence into
practical decisions, for deterrence means modifying individual behav-
ior." 134 To effectuate this translation, the court utilized a two-step
process.
First, the court considered the "relationship between the [seizing
agents' official] responsibilities and expertise ... and the ... pro-
ceeding at which the seized material [was] being offered." 3 This
inquiry provides a general assumption about the seizing officials'
likely motivation. A court may infer the efficacy of a deterrent sanc-
tion from the jurisdictional scope of the officials' agency. This step
neatly confines the rule's applicability to those proceedings that are
closely related to the official purpose of the search. More importantly,
this step injects a measure of objectivity into a very subjective and
undefined portion of the Calandra balancing formula. Applying this
step to the facts in Tirado, the court found that the civil tax proceed-
ing was "too remote" from the seizing agents' "zone of primary inter-
est" to believe that suppression would serve the deterrent purpose of
the rule. 36 The court noted that the collection of taxes is generally not
a motivating factor for narcotics agents.' 3
7
Recognizing, however, that a mere examination of agents' official
duties may be insufficient to determine fully the value of exclusion,
the court extended the analysis. 138 In a second step, the court consid-
ered any evidence of actual collusion between the seizing officials and
the proponent of the evidence in the subsequent civil proceeding. "3
This step adds a necessary subjective component, permitting a court to
consider specific facts that refute the general assumption about the
agents' motives. Hence, a court may delve beneath the surface deter-
mination to explore the possibility of actual improper motive or collu-
sion. Evidence of a formal or informal agreement, a liaison relation-
ship or a general policy of cooperation is relevant to this inquiry. In
Tirado, the court found no specific facts tending to show formal or
informal cooperation between the agencies. 40 Accordingly, the court
132. See id. at 310.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 311.
136. Id. at 314.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 312.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 314-15.
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concluded that the general expectation concerning the motivation of
the agents as found in the first step had not been undermined.' 14
By analyzing the seizing officials' motivation, this two-step process
provides a full and accurate framework for assessing potential deter-
rence. Once assessed, the deterrent effect can be more accurately
weighed in the Calandra balance. This avoids the possibility of either
underestimating the deterrent effect or overemphasizing the injury to
society. The opportunity to employ this approach will arise most often
in civil actions in which the government is a party. Indeed, more than
one agency frequently benefits from the fruits of an illegal search.
This is demonstrated by the many instances in which the IRS has
based assessments on evidence seized during narcotics and gambling
investigations. 142
Use of Tirado in private civil litigation, although less likely, is not
unforeseeable. Concededly, government agents do not typically base
their decision to carry out potentially illegal searches on whether the
evidence could be used in private civil litigation. Occasionally, how-
ever, exclusion in a private civil litigation may yield a deterrent effect.
Such situations might arise when there is a customary symbiotic rela-
tionship between government and private investigators. 143
Additionally, the Tirado approach is clearly superior to the inflexi-
ble application of the quasi-criminal 144 or intrasovereign exceptions.145
It is far more equitable in its recognition that effective deterrence of
unlawful searches may exist beyond the criminal or quasi-criminal
context. It correctly focuses on the relationship of the official to the
proceeding as the crucial factor, rather than the nature of the pro-
ceeding itself. Further, this approach considers the many instances of
intrasovereign bureaucratic rivalry and intersovereign cooperation. 46
Thus, by focusing on the realities of law enforcement, it furthers the
deterrent purpose of the rule by excluding evidence in appropriate
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 436-37 (1976); Tirado v.
Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307, 315 (2d Cir. 1982); Velasco v. IRS, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9590, at 84,924 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Estate of McDonald v. United States, 79-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9182, at 86,293 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Gaston v. United States,
79-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9126, at 86,087 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Backos v. United
States, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 16,350, at 85,937-38 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Guz-
zetta v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 173, 174 (1982).
143. It has been suggested that such a symbiotic relationship exists between police
and fire officials and insurance company investigators with regard to possible arson
cases. See Denenberg & Gordon, The Exclusionary Rule in Civil Litigation: Sifting
Through the Ashes of Michigan v. Tyler, 47 Ins. Couns. J. 375, 380 (1980). These
commentators went so far as to advise insurance companies to conduct independent
investigations to avoid the possible taint of illegal seizures. Id. at 382.
144. See supra pt. II(A).
145. See supra pt. II(B).
146. See supra note 98.
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intersovereign situations. Moreover, it avoids the unnecessary exclu-
sion of relevant evidence created by an intrasovereign rule of exclu-
sion.
CONCLUSION
The applicability of the exclusionary rule to subsequent civil pro-
ceedings presents a complex legal issue. Courts that focus solely on
either the nature of the proceeding or the identity of the sovereign fail
to address adequately the primary function of the exclusionary rule-
deterrence. A meaningful application of the Calandra balance of
interests test to this situation requires an accurate assessment of the
potential deterrent effect to be derived from exclusion.
The two-step analysis introduced in Tirado v. Commissioner pro-
vides the requisite accuracy by delving into the seizing officials' mo-
tives for conducting the search, on both objective and subjective
levels. Once assessed, the potential deterrent effect can be more mean-
ingfully weighed against the societal loss that would result from exclu-
sion. Moreover, the flexibility of this two-step inquiry enhances its
usefulness in the growing number of private, diverse civil lawsuits in
which the issue arises.
Christine L. Andreoli
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